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ABSTRACT 
          Short-sellers assist in impounding negative news more quickly into stock prices and improve 
price informativeness. However, there is a lack of consistent evidence about when and how short-
sellers acquire an information advantage – i.e., private vs. public channels, and incorporate such 
information into their trading activities. To shed light on these questions, I exploit Reg SHO to 
examine price informativeness before, during and after earnings announcements. I show that 
relative to control firms, pilot firms have greater (less) price informativeness before (during) 
earnings announcements, suggesting that short-sellers are informed via the private channel and 
that the segment of short-sellers that trade on earnings news is populated predominantly by those 
who acquire private information prior to earnings releases. I also find that the main results are 
more pronounced for a sub-sample comprised of firms with low corporate transparency, relative 
to a sub-sample with high corporate transparency.  
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In this study, I investigate when and how short-sellers are informed.  Specifically, I exploit 
the quasi-natural experimental setting provided by the introduction of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Regulation SHO (Reg SHO), which significantly reduced the constraints faced 
by short-sellers for a subsample of U.S. firms (pilot group), and investigate whether this is 
associated with a change in information arrival around earnings announcements. That is, I explore 
whether the stock price of the pilot group reflects the upcoming earnings news in a more timely 
fashion resulting in less information being available during earnings announcements.  
As informed investors, short-sellers assist in impounding negative news more quickly into 
stock prices (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia 1987), and hence potentially improve price 
informativeness (e.g., Boehmer and Wu 2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2010).  However, there is a 
lack of consistent evidence about when and how short-sellers acquire an information advantage, 
and when they incorporate such information into their trading activities (e.g., Boehmer, Jones, and 
Zhang 2012; Engelberg, Reed, and Ringgenberg 2012).1 Short-sellers can be informed through 
private information acquisition (which I refer to as the private channel) and/or through superior 
information processing of public information (the public channel). If the private channel exists, 
then the information will be reflected in the stock price prior to its public release due to short-
selling activities. On the other hand, if the public channel dominates, the information will be 
impounded after the public information is released.  Given that the above two channels are not 
mutually exclusive, it is an interesting question to empirically assess the extent to which the two 
                                                 
1  One stream of literature (e.g., Christophe, Ferri, and Angel 2004; Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh 2010; Desai, 
Krishnamurthy, and Venkataraman 2006; Karpoff and Lou 2010) provides evidence that short-sellers can predict 
upcoming earnings news, financial restatements, analyst downgrades and financial misconduct. Another stream (e.g., 
Blau and Pinegar 2013; Drake, Rees, and Swanson 2011; Engelberg et al. 2012) instead argues that short-sellers’ 
information advantage comes from reacting to news (e.g., earnings news and financial restatements). 
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channels reflect short-sellers’ information acquisition.  I investigate this question by examining 
price informativeness before, during and after earnings announcements. I focus on earnings 
announcements because earnings are a premier and highly visible source of firm-specific 
information, and investors rely on earnings more than any other measure of performance (e.g., 
Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper 2004; Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005).2  
To draw a causal link between short-selling and price informativeness, I exploit an 
exogenous shock to short-selling activities.3  In July 2004, the SEC adopted Rule 202T of Reg 
SHO, which established procedures for the SEC to temporarily suspend any short-sale price test 
(including the tick test for exchange-listed stocks and the bid test for Nasdaq National Market 
stocks) — a short-sale constraint — on short-selling in U.S. equity markets, in order for the SEC 
to study the effectiveness of the tests.4  Under the Reg SHO pilot program, short-sale constraints 
were suspended for only a subset of (effectively) randomly selected firms (pilot firms), while those 
                                                 
2 Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther (2010) document that stock returns during management forecasts can explain 
firms’ quarterly returns better than those during earnings announcements. In this study, I focus on earnings 
announcements, and not management forecasts, for two reasons. First, given that only 40 percent firms provide 
management forecasts during the Reg SHO period, centering on management forecasts will cause substantial data 
attrition. Second, given that this study is aimed at examining whether short-sellers can acquire earnings news before 
the announcements, a voluntary disclosure decision is not an appropriate event because short-sellers may affect 
corporates’ voluntary disclosures and their content. Specifically, there is less of a concern regarding endogeneity 
with earnings announcements.    
3 Prior literature suggests that the less informativeness of a firm’s stock price can potentially increase short-selling, 
which may give rise to a potential endogeneity concern when short-interest is an explanatory variable to examine the 
effect of short-selling on price informativeness. Therefore, Reg SHO provides a clean setting for this study to 
mitigate this reverse causality concern. For example, Sloan (1996) finds that the high accruals are associated with 
firms’ low future returns and Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and Tuna (2005) attribute this association to mispricing. 
Specifically, Richardson et al. (2005) argue that naive investors do not understand the implications of accrual 
reliability and earnings persistence, and they will be surprised by next period’s low earnings performance, resulting 
in negative abnormal returns in the next period. As informed investors, short-sellers have incentives to exploit this 
mispricing and increase short-interest in firms with the high accruals (e.g., Curtis and Fargher 2014; Desai et al. 
2006). 
4 In 1938, the NYSE adopted an uptick rule, Rule 10a-1, known as the “tick test”. The rule requires that a short-sale 
cannot be completed if the current bid price is below the most recently traded price (plus tick). In 1994, the 
NASDAQ also adopted its own price test under Rule 3350, requiring a short-sale to occur at a price one penny 
above the current bid price if the current bid price is a downtick from the previous bid. The purpose of these tests is 
to prevent short-sellers from participating in market manipulation that forces prices downward. 
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for other firms (control firms) remained unchanged.5 As a result, around the announcement date,  
short interest increased dramatically for pilot firms compared to control firms (Grullon, 
Michenaud, and Weston 2015), consistent with Reg SHO having a substantial effect on short-
selling activities for the pilot firms. Managers also appeared sensitive to such effects on their firms.  
For instance, in a 2008 NYSE survey, the majority of top executives surveyed were in favour of 
re-instituting the price tests as soon as possible (Grullon et al. 2015).  Therefore, the exogenous 
shock to short-sale constraints along with the randomization of treatment firms under Reg SHO 
provides an attractive quasi-natural experimental setting within which to examine the potential 
causal effect of short-selling on price informativeness around earnings announcements. 
I investigate the short-selling effect via difference-in-differences (DiD) comparisons 
between pilot vs. control firms before and during the Reg SHO pilot program.6  Following Ball 
and Shivakumar (2008), I quantify the informativeness of stock prices by using the R-squared (R2) 
in a regression of securities’ quarterly abnormal returns (centred on earnings announcements) on 
several sub-period abnormal returns.7 The R2 reflects the proportion of variation of quarterly 
returns explained by the sub-period returns, and can be interpreted as reflecting the information 
                                                 
5 As per the Rule 202T’s pilot program, stocks in the Russell 3000 index as of June 25, 2004 were ranked by 
average daily dollar volume of trade over the 1 year prior to the issuance of Reg SHO from highest to lowest for the 
period. Within each exchange — American Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ — every 
third ranked-stock was drawn from the pool and designated into the pilot group, resulting in a pilot group 
comprising 986 stocks and a control group (comprising all remaining stocks in the Russell 3000 index). From May 
2, 2005 to August 6, 2007, pilot stocks were exempted from short-sale price tests, and after August 2007, the SEC 
repealed the price test rule on short-selling for all stocks. 
6 For completeness, I also examine the difference between pilot and controls after the Reg SHO pilot program 
expired, and the results are discussed in the section of further analysis.  
7 Use of a multi-day pre-announcement window is appealing because it is unlikely for short-sellers to trade only one 
or two days before earnings announcements. For example, Kyle (1985) argues that informed traders are more likely 
to hide their private information by engaging in many relatively smaller trades rather than a single large trade. 
Therefore, a long pre-announcement interval can more likely help us fully capture the effect of short-selling on price 
informativeness regarding the upcoming announcement. The associated risk, on the other hand, is that information 
and short-selling unrelated to the upcoming news may be incorporated in the testing. Given that I have no ex-ante 
prediction about the period during which short-sellers trade on the upcoming news, I choose different periods from a 
28-day (middle point between 2 adjacent earnings announcements) to a 5-day pre-announcement period. Given the 
well-documented post earnings announcement drift, I choose a symmetric post-announcement period accordingly.   
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content in the sub-period relative to the total information arriving and causing price movement 
throughout the entire quarter.  I first examine the differential R2 between pilot and control firms 
when the sub-period return is measured over a pre-announcement window.  If short-sellers are 
informed via the private channel, and their trading enhances the informativeness of stock prices, 
pilot firms will have a larger R2 when the sub-period return is measured over a pre-announcement 
window.  I find evidence consistent with this prediction: the average R2 of pilot firms is 0.02-0.06 
larger than that of control firms during the Reg SHO pilot program and statistically significant, 
suggesting that more information arriving throughout the entire quarter is priced before earnings 
announcements due to short-sellers’ trading based on private information.  
I then consider the differential R2 when the sub-period return is measured over an 
announcement window. This allows me to investigate the relative importance of the two channels 
of information acquisition because the observed R2 is the net result of two opposite effects exerted 
by the two channels of short-selling.  First, if short-sellers are informed via the public channel 
(through superior analysis of earnings announcements), the R2 when the sub-period is based on 
the announcement window will be larger for pilot firms than for control firms.  Second, if short-
sellers are informed via the private channel, the R2 will be smaller for pilot firms because earnings 
news is already partially priced prior to the announcements.  Therefore, observing a smaller R2 
suggests a dominant role for the private channel.  I find that the R2 of pilot firms is 0.02-0.04 
smaller when the sub-period return is measured during the announcement period.  Along with the 
first finding where pilot firms have larger R2 when the sub-period return is measured before 
announcements, this finding suggests that the segment of short-sellers that trade on earnings news 
is populated predominantly by those who acquire private information prior to the earnings release. 
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The above research methodology and empirical findings are implicitly based upon the 
assumption that short-selling is informative, captured by the change in the R2.  To validate this 
assumption, I examine the differential R2 (pilot vs. control firm) when the sub-period return is 
measured over the post-announcement period.  If the assumption is valid (i.e., short-sellers are 
informed), pilot firms will have a smaller R2 when quarterly returns are regressed on the returns 
during the post-announcement period because more earnings information is already priced either 
before or during earnings announcements.  Otherwise, if short-selling increases price noise and 
impedes the impounding of news into the stock price, pilot firms will have a larger R2 because 
short-sellers’ uninformed trading will likely impede the impounding of news into the stock price 
during the announcement period, and consequently delay the information to the post-
announcement period.  I find that pilot firms have a smaller R2 when regressing quarterly returns 
on returns during the post-announcement period, and this is consistent with the implicit assumption 
that short-selling on average is informative.  
Next, I analyse cross-sectional variation in the effect of short-selling on the information 
arrival around earnings announcements.  Limited corporate transparency increases demand for 
private information to alleviate the information gap between managers and outside investors.  For 
example, Verrecchia (1982) suggests that traders increase private information acquisition when 
the precision of accounting disclosure is low. I predict and find that short-sellers’ private 
information collection is more pronounced for a sub-sample comprised of firms with low corporate 
transparency, relative to a sub-sample with high corporate transparency. 
Although my findings are consistent with a dominant portion of short-sellers being 
privately informed, short-sellers can also predict upcoming earnings by processing publicly 
available information.  I consider two types of publicly available information upon which short-
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sellers might trade before an upcoming earnings announcement. One is the firms’ unexpected 
earnings surprise in previous quarters. As the prior literature suggests, firms reporting a 
positive/negative earnings surprise in the previous quarter are more likely to be followed by a 
positive/negative earnings surprise in the current quarter. Short-sellers may anticipate less/more 
profitability if the earnings surprise is positive/negative in the previous quarter, and the trade is 
based upon such a prediction. The other type of publicly available information relates to firms’ 
growth opportunities. As prior literature suggests, short-sellers sell high growth firms because 
those firms provide short-sellers with greater potential profits (relative to value firms) when 
earnings news is unfavourable.  I find that neither of these two alternatives can explain the 
difference in price informativeness between pilot and control firms during the Reg SHO program. 
Finally, I conduct two robustness checks. First, to bolster the claim that short-sellers are 
informed, I examine the post-earnings announcement drift (PEAD) for pilot firms, by 
implementing the methodology developed in Ball and Shivakumar (2008). This approach provides 
an opportunity to examine the effect of short-selling on price efficiency without assuming market-
efficiency or a model for computing earnings news. Specifically, I compare the coefficient of sub-
period abnormal returns in the regression of securities’ quarterly abnormal returns with unity 
where larger/smaller than unity suggests an under/over-reaction in the announcement window.  I 
find that during the Reg SHO period the coefficient for pilot firms is insignificantly different from 
one at conventional levels, suggesting neither under-reaction (i.e. PEAD) nor over-reaction for 
pilot firms. Second, I examine the difference in the R2 after the expiration of the Reg SHO program 
and document a diminishing effect of short-selling in the year immediately after Reg SHO expired. 
My study contributes to the related literature in several ways. First, my findings 
complement prior research on the sources of short-sellers’ information advantage.  Christophe et 
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al. (2004) find that short-selling is negatively related to returns during earnings announcements, 
suggesting that short-sellers have private information regarding upcoming earnings news.  In 
contrast, Blau and Pinegar (2013) find short-sellers are not incrementally informed before earnings 
announcements, after controlling for their ability to predict future returns during the non-
announcement period as documented by Diether, Lee, and Werner (2009a), suggesting that short-
sellers have no private information related to earnings.  By employing an exogenous shock to 
short-selling constraints, I document a causal link between short-selling and price informativeness 
before earnings announcements, providing robust evidence consistent with short-sellers possessing 
private information about upcoming earnings news. 
Second, I extend the literature by demonstrating that the segment of short-sellers that trades 
on earnings news is predominantly populated by those who acquire private information before an 
earnings release.  Though prior literature (e.g., Christophe et al. 2004; Christophe et al. 2010; 
Engelberg et al. 2012) documents evidence regarding whether short-sellers’ informational 
advantage comes from a private or public channel, to my knowledge no study examines the relative 
importance of those two channels.  Given that they are non-exclusive, I investigate the two 
channels together and find more (less) information throughout a quarter is concentrated during the 
pre-announcement (announcement) period, suggesting that the private channel dominates the 
public channel.  
Finally, I provide novel evidence that opaque firms’ information environment increases 
activities of investors’ private information collection to fill the information asymmetry gap 
between managers and investors.  For example, Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) document 
that analysts are more likely to follow firms with high information asymmetry (e.g., high levels of 
intangible assets) because of higher demand from investors for information. I find that limited 
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corporate transparency provides short-sellers (informed investors) greater informational advantage 
over other investors. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section Ⅱ, I describe in more detail 
the related literature and my research questions.  Sections Ⅲ and Ⅳ describe the sample and my 
research design, while section Ⅴ presents my empirical results and section Ⅵ concludes. 
II. RELATED LITERATURE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this section, I provide some institutional background to Reg SHO, review related 
literature and propose my research questions.  
The Background to Reg SHO 
Rule 202T of Reg SHO was adopted by the SEC in July 2004 to establish procedures 
enabling it to temporarily suspend particular short-sale price tests for a subset of firms (pilot firms), 
without affecting the short-sale constraints of other firms (control firms).  On June 25, 2004, Rule 
202T’s pilot program ranked stocks in the Russell 3000 index from highest to lowest by their 
average daily dollar volume of trade spread across a period of one year before the implementation 
of Reg SHO.  Every third-ranked stock from the American Stock Exchange (NYSE American), 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and NASDAQ respectively, totalling 986 stocks, was 
assigned into a pilot group, while the remaining Russell 3000 index stocks went into a control 
group. 
While pilot stocks were exempted from short-sale price tests between May 2, 2005 and 
July 6, 2007, the price test rule on short-selling for all stocks was revoked by the SEC after August 
2007, leading to large scale disappointment across managers and exchanges.  An NYSE survey in 
2008 revealed that 85percent of top managers favoured reintroduction of the price tests on an 
immediate basis (Grullon et al. 2015).  The SEC was partly blamed for the 2007-08 financial crisis 
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by several stakeholders, including law firms, members of congress and journalists, because of 
increased short-selling.  On February 24, 2010, the SEC relented under the pressure, and restored 
a revised upward trend rule that triggers price tests when a firm’s stock price drops by 10percent 
or more compared to the previous closing price. 
Impact of Reg SHO on Information Arrival around Earnings Announcements 
Prior evidence suggests that short-sellers are informed traders; future negative returns are 
predicted by high short interest or short volumes (e.g., Asquith, Pathak, and Ritter 2005; Senchack 
and Starks 1993), and short-sellers’ trading can improve price efficiency (e.g., Boehmer and Wu 
2013; Saffi and Sigurdsson 2010). The predictability of future returns indicates that short-sellers 
have an information advantage over other investors. Prior research suggests that this information 
advantage may come from two sources.  First, short-sellers may become informed via a private 
channel, where information is not publicly available.  This argument is supported by evidence that 
short-selling activities increase before negative earnings, analyst downgrades or revelation of 
firms’ financial misconduct (e.g., Christophe et al. 2004; Christophe et al. 2010; Karpoff and Lou 
2010).  Second, they may also become informed via a public channel - through more efficient 
processing of publicly available information.  For example, by combining a large archive of all 
corporate news events with daily short-selling, Engelberg et al. (2012) comprehensively examine 
the relation between short-selling and news events. They find that short-selling increases 
significantly after news announcements, and that the well-documented negative correlation 
between short-selling and negative returns is twice as large on news days, and four times as large 
on negative news days. 
In summary, the private information channel suggests that short-sellers bring information 
to the market prior to public information arrival, while the public information channel suggests 
10 
 
that short-sellers impound information into stock price when such information is publicly 
announced.  I exploit this difference to infer when and how short-sellers are informed by examining 
price informativeness pre-, during and post-earnings announcements.  Specifically, to the extent 
that Reg SHO significantly reduces the cost of short-selling in pilot firms, I examine the differences 
in price informativeness between pilot and control firms around earnings announcements.  An 
observation that pilot firms are more price informative than control firms before earnings 
announcements implies the short-sellers are informed via the private channel. Therefore, I 
formalize the first research question as follows: 
 R1: During the implementation of Reg SHO, are pilot firms more price informative pre-
earnings announcements, compared to control firms? 
Impounding private information prior to earnings announcements results in less (new) 
information being available when earnings are announced.8  On the other hand, if short-sellers 
possess superior ability in processing public earnings news, they may also impound information 
more quickly during the earnings window. Because the private and public channels are not 
exclusive, the observed differential price informativeness at earnings announcements represent the 
net effect of the two channels, and less informativeness implies dominance of the private channel.  
Therefore, I formalize the second research question as follows.  
                                                 
8 The implicit assumption is that total earnings-related information is constant and short-sellers have knowledge, at 
least in part, of upcoming earnings. That is, firms do not alter the information provided in the earnings reports in 
response to the presence of short-sellers, and short-sellers’ trading pre-earnings announcements increases price 
informativeness. Alternatively, the higher price informativeness could also reflect short-sellers’ knowledge of some 
negative news beyond the upcoming earnings (e.g., earnings restatements), which has no effect on price 
informativeness during earnings announcements. To disentangle the alternatives, I employ a sample comprising 
firms with good earnings news. The untabulated results show no difference in informativeness between pilot and 
control firms before earnings announcements. This suggests that the motive for short-selling is more likely related to 
the upcoming earnings. In addition, examining price informativeness (measured by R2) during earnings 
announcements can provide some insights because an observation of lower price informativeness is consistent with 
short-sellers being informative with respect to upcoming earnings.  
11 
 
R2: During the implementation of Reg SHO, are pilot firms less price informative during 
earnings announcements, relative to control firms? 
The above two research questions are based upon the assumption that short-sellers are 
informed investors, which implies reduced information post-earnings announcements regardless 
of the information channel – private or public. That is, pilot firms have less information in their 
price post-earnings announcements, compared to control firms. In contrast, if short-sellers are 
mainly uninformed investors who just trade in the direction of earnings news and increase stock 
price volatility when earnings are announced, pilot firms will have more information in their price 
during post-announcement period because informed traders would correct the effects of noisy 
short-selling at the announcements. Therefore, examining price informativeness post-earnings 
announcements can assist in answering the question: Are short-sellers informed?  This leads to my 
third research question as follows: 
R3: During the implementation of Reg SHO, are pilot firms more price informative post-
earnings announcements in comparison to control firms? 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION 
I begin with the Russell index as of June 2004.  On July 28, 2004, the SEC announced that 
out of the Russell 3000, 986 stocks would trade without any price test restrictions applied to short-
sales during the term of the pilot program.9  Following the SEC requirements, I exclude stocks that 
are not listed on the NYSE, NYSE American or Nasdaq, and also those that went private or had 
spin-offs after April 30, 2004.  As a result, I identify 986 pilot firm stocks (the pilot group) 
                                                 
9 Details of the pilot list are available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/34-50104.htm. 
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according to the published list of the SEC’s pilot order, and 1,986 non-pilot firm stocks (the control 
group).10  
I obtained financial statement data from COMPUSTAT and stock returns from CRSP.  
Additionally, I obtained analyst following and management earnings forecast information from 
I/B/E/S to investigate the cross-sectional variation of the findings in firms’ information 
environment.  I define the Reg SHO pilot period (durSHO) as the period from May 2, 2005 to July 
6, 2007, when the pilot program was in place.  Furthermore, I examine whether the effect of Reg 
SHO on price efficiency around earnings announcements diminishes after August 2007, when the 
uptick rule was also suspended for the control group.  I choose the post-SHO implementation 
period (postSHO) as the period from August 2007 to July 2008.11 
Following related literature (e.g., Diether, Lee, and Werner 2009b; Grullon et al. 2015), I 
exclude firms with a stock price of less than $1 from the sample.  I also exclude firm-quarters with 
less than 30 days of stock returns pre- and post-earnings announcements. Additionally, I include 
only bad earnings news in the sample, computed as the actual EPS (from I/B/E/S) minus the mean 
analysts’ earnings forecasts during the 30 days before earnings announcements (from I/B/E/S 
detailed file).12 13   
                                                 
10 The total number of firms in my sample at this step is 2,972, comparable to the 2,952 identified by Fang, Huang, 
and Karpoff (2016).  
11 I do not include the second half of post-Reg SHO to avoid the effect of the global financial crisis (2008-2009).  
12 Relative to random-walk forecasts (e.g., the earnings from the same quarter of the previous year), the analyst 
forecast consensus is timely and comprehensive, and has been used widely in empirical research as a benchmark for 
unobservable market earnings expectations because analysts have incentives to quickly impound value-relevant 
predictions into their forecasts. See Bhattacharya, Black, Christensen, and Mergenthaler (2007).  
13 To improve the power of my tests, I focus on bad earnings news because prior studies document an increase in 
short-selling prior to various firms’ negative news (Christophe et al. 2004). The bad earnings news is defined as 
earnings news where the actual earnings are lower than analyst consensus. 
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Finally, to exclude the confounding effect of management forecasts on the earnings news, 
I exclude earnings announcements bundled with management forecasts.14 The final sample covers 
the durSHO and is comprised of 1858 (3861) firm-quarters and 624 (1278) unique firms in pilot 
(control), respectively.  
IV. RESEARCH DESIGN AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
I employ a difference-in-differences approach, using Reg SHO as the quasi-natural 
experiment, to identify the causal effect of short-selling on price informativeness around earnings 
announcements.  Specifically, I compare price informativeness pre-, during and post-earnings 
announcements between pilot firms and control firms before, during and after the pilot program. 
 Measurement of Price Informativeness 
To examine the research questions, I build on the approach used by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2008). They quantify the value-relevant new information in earnings announcements by 
estimating the proportion of variation in annual stock returns associated with four “announcement 
window” quarterly earnings-announcements returns.15 In this study, I adapt the Ball-Shivakumar 
framework to quarterly returns and three associated sub-period returns – pre-, during, and post-
earnings announcements.  Specifically, I regress quarterly returns – RETi(quarterly) on returns in 
                                                 
14Following Rogers and Van Buskirk (2013), an earnings announcement is treated as bundled with management 
earnings forecasts if a management forecast is provided within 3 days of an earnings announcement. I analyze the 
earnings announcements bundled with management forecast separately and the results are discussed in the footnote 
21.  
15 Ball and Shivakumar (2008) employ the R-squared from a regression of annual stock returns on four quarterly 
earnings announcements returns as a measure of new information in earnings announcements. There are two 
advantages to this approach. First, there is no need to estimate an earnings surprise that requires an estimated earnings 
expectation, which reduces errors in measuring expectation. Second, this approach does not assume market efficiency. 
It allows price revisions during earnings announcements window to be correlated with price revisions outside the 
window. Therefore, it is less susceptible to underestimating the information in the earnings announcements. Indeed, 
the method provides a test of market efficiency. If the coefficient on the earnings announcements returns is greater 
(less) than one, it suggests an initial market under (over) reaction to earnings announcements. For instance, Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008) document the coefficients on the four quarterly earnings announcements are on average all greater 
than one, consistent with the post-earnings-announcements drift (PEAD) phenomenon.  
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sub-period returns – RETi(pre_announce), RETi(dur_announce) and RETi(post_announce) around 
earnings-announcement windows, respectively:  
0 1( ) ( _ )t tRET quarterly RET sub period      (1) 
Where RET(sub_period)t is RET(pre_announce) , RETi(dur_announce) or 
RETi(post_announce) to investigate research questions 1, 2 or 3 respectively. The adjusted R
2 from 
the above regression measures the proportion of quarterly returns variation associated with each 
sub-period.  In the following subsections, I discuss issues relating to empirical implementation and 
interpretation of this approach. 
Returns Measurement 
In the main tests, quarterly returns are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-
weighted market returns) over days -28 to +28, relative to earnings-announcement date, day 0. 
Earnings-announcement returns are buy-and-hold abnormal returns over days -1 to +1.  Returns 
pre-/post-earnings announcements are buy-and-hold abnormal returns over days -28 to -2, and +2 
to +28, respectively. Panel A of Figure 1 illustrates this design.16 
In further analysis, to examine how short-selling affects PEAD, I regress the quarterly 
returns RETi(quarterly) on returns at announcements RETi (dur_announce), where RETi 
(quarterly) is the buy-and-hold abnormal return over days -1 to +31, relative to the earnings-
announcement date, day 0.  Earnings-announcement returns are still buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns over days -1 to +1.  This modified research design helps me to investigate more accurately 
                                                 
16 To mitigate the concern of correlation of LHS variable (i.e. quarterly stock returns), I exclude firm-quarters with 
less than 57 trading days between two consecutive earnings announcements dates, which results in an approximately 
29 percent observation attrition. Another way to resolve the correlation issue is to shorten the 57-day window. I also 
employ this approach in the study. However, the above approaches cannot eliminate all source of correlation, such as 
the correlation simply due to common industry membership.     
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the extent to which information during earnings-announcement drifts to the post-announcement 
period. Panel B of Figure 1 illustrates this design. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
Interpretation of R2 
I estimate model (1) for pilot and control firms separately, and the difference in estimated 
R2 captures the effect of short-selling on price informativeness around earnings announcements.  
For example, I regress RETi(quarterly) on RETi(pre_announce) for pilot and control firms during 




control > 0) suggests more information is 
impounded into the pilot firms’ prices pre-earnings announcements.  A similar method and 
interpretation is applied when I regress RETi(quarterly) on RETi(dur_announce) or 
RETi(post_announce). Since I am interested in examining whether short-sellers possess private 
information relating to earnings, a long event-window (i.e., days -28 to +28, relative to earnings-
announcement date, day0) may incorporate other information sources apart from upcoming 
earnings, and potentially dampens the inferences. Therefore, I systematically narrow the window 
size for RETi(quarterly) and the associated RETi(pre_announce) and RETi(post_announce) to 
counter this possibility. 17   The window width starts at 28 days, and is narrowed by 3-day 
increments until 4 days pre-/post-earnings announcements.18  
                                                 
17 Adjusting the event-window can provide two additional benefits. First, it allows me to examine the robustness of 
the results to the window period.  Second, the changing window period can provide additional insight regarding when 
information is impounded into price by short-sellers. For example, if short-sellers impound information into price on 
average 28 days pre-earnings announcements, I will find weaker or no increase of price informativeness pre-earnings 
announcements when I use 25 days or shorter windows. 
18 Nevertheless, narrowing the window comes with its own costs. One cost is that a portion of earnings news might 
be impounded into price by short-sellers beyond the scope of the window. Hence the inference from the results with 
a narrower window, e.g., [-16, +16], should consider the results with a wider window, e.g., [-28, +28], to avoid 
misinterpretation. An example is provided and discussed in the results section. 
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Statistical Test on R2DIFF 
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2008), I interpret R2DIFF between pilot and control firms 
during Reg SHO as reflecting the effect of short-selling on price informativeness around earnings 
announcements.  Due to the small sample size for R2DIFF, the normal distribution assumption 
underlying student t tests might be inappropriate.  Specifically, there are only eight quarters in the 
Reg SHO period, resulting in only eight estimated R2DIFF values.  To overcome this potential 
problem, I test the statistical significance of R2DIFF during the pilot period using a test based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period.
19  Specifically, I randomly select, 
with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately before the Reg SHO 
announcements and re-estimate the model (1).  Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between the pilot 
and control firms.  By repeating this procedure a thousand times, I obtain an empirical distribution 
of R2DIFF (with 1,000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period.  I assume that this empirical 
distribution reflects the distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-
selling between the pilot and control firms.  I use the empirical distribution to determine the 
significance level of the observed R2DIFF from the pilot period.  
Descriptive Statistics 
In Table 1, I compare the primary research variables between pilot and control firms pre-
Reg SHO announcement.  Because the pilot firms are chosen by (effectively) random selection 
from Russell 3000 index firms, there should be no systematic difference between these two groups 
pre-SHO.  In general, pilot firms do not significantly differ from control firms in the pre-Reg SHO 
period for returns (RET(quarterly), RETi(pre_announce), RETi(dur_announce) and 
RETi(post_announce)), firm size (SIZE) and growth opportunities (MTB).  Furthermore, the mean 
                                                 




abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) during the three-day window at 
earnings announcements is 0.4 percent (0.004), which is consistent with the results in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2008).  However, pilot firms have a higher average ROA of 0.4 percent (i.e., 0.5 
percent vs. 0.1 percent), significant at the 1 percent level.  I investigate this issue and find that the 
difference is weaker if I use the data from one year prior to the Reg SHO announcement, which is 
the time period used by the SEC to choose the pilot firms. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
V. RESULTS 
I organise the discussion of my empirical results into three subsections. In the first section, 
I provide evidence on an association between short-selling and price informativeness in each sub-
period around earnings announcements.  In the second section, I examine the relation between the 
corporate information environment and the effect of short-selling on price informativeness.  
Finally, in the third section, I provide further evidence consistent with short-sellers possessing 
private information relating to upcoming earnings news.  
The Effect of Short-selling on Price Informativeness  
Pre-earnings Announcements 
In this section, I examine whether short-selling is associated with change in price 
informativeness pre-earnings announcements.  Row 1 of Table 2 reports the R2DIFF from estimating 
equation (1) for pilot and control firms when the right-hand-side (RHS) return-window is pre-
earnings announcements – RETi(pre_announce) during Reg SHO.  When the quarterly returns are 
computed at days -28 to +28, namely [-28, +28], the R2 from the regression for control (pilot) firms 
is 0.38 (0.45), indicating that control (pilot) firms’ stock returns pre-earnings announcements 
incorporate 38 percent (45 percent) of total quarterly information during Reg SHO.  The R2DIFF 
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(i.e., 0.06) falls into the 99 percent top tail of the empirical distribution generated from the pre-
Reg SHO period, indicating that short-selling significantly increases pilot firms’ price 
informativeness pre-earnings announcements.  Furthermore, this difference is of economic 
significance because the pilot firms increased their R2 by 13 percent (0.06/0.45) on average during 
the Reg SHO.  
Varying the return-window from [-28, +28] to [-4, +4], relative to earnings announcements 
(day 0), I obtain a series of R2DIFF.  All are statistically significant at conventional levels (from the 
right most column to the left most column in Row 1), indicating that short-sellers impound 
information into price consistently in the days leading up to earnings announcements.  
Regarding R1 (During the implementation of Reg SHO, are pilot firms more price 
informative prior to earnings announcements, compared to control firms?) the results show that 
pilot firms’ price informativeness is consistently greater prior to earnings announcements, 
compared to that of control firms, strongly consistent with the notion that short-sellers are informed 
via private information channels.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 During earnings Announcements 
I next investigate the relation between short-selling and price informativeness during 
earnings announcements. Row 2 of Table 2 reports the R2DIFF from estimating equation (1) for pilot 
and control firms when the RHS return-window is during earnings announcements – 
RETi(dur_announce) during Reg SHO.  When quarterly returns are measured at [-28, +28], the 
R2DIFF (i.e., -0.03) is significant at the 1 percent level (one-tailed), suggesting that pilot firms have 
significantly less information during earnings announcements.  Given that this R2DIFF reflects both 
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short-sellers pricing in information prior to announcements and those reacting to announcements, 
the negative value suggests a dominance of short-sellers possessing private information. 
Adjusting the quarterly return-window from [-28, +28] to [-7, +7], the R2DIFF is consistently 
and significantly negative at conventional levels.  This provides a positive answer to R2 (During 
the implementation of Reg SHO, are pilot firms less price informative during earnings 
announcements, relative to control firms?), and hence suggests a dominant role of the private 
channel over the public channel for short-sellers in gathering information.     
Post-earnings Announcements 
Finally, I investigate the association between short-selling and the information content of 
stock prices during the post-announcement period.  Row 3 of Table 2 reports the R2DIFF from model 
(1) for pilot and control firms, when the RHS return-window is measured during the post-
announcement period – RETi(post_announce).  The R2DIFF is -0.03 (significant at 10 percent level) 
when quarterly returns are measured at [-28, +28], and consistently and significantly negative at 
conventional levels for other event-windows.  This indicates that control firms’ prices reflect more 
value-related information during the post-announcement period than pilot firms’ prices, and is 
consistent with the notion of short-sellers being informed traders.  The negative R2DIFF might 
reflect either timely (i.e., pre- and/or during earnings announcements) or delayed price-in of 
information (i.e., beyond 28 days after earnings announcements).  I argue that the former is more 
likely to occur for two reasons.  First, the results in Row 1 provide strong evidence that short-
sellers privately collect earnings information, and hence reduce the amount of information 
available during/post-earnings announcements.  Second, if the latter was the primary factor, the 
consistently negative R2DIFF with various event-windows (from [-4, +4] to [-28, +28]) would 
suggest that the information is not shifted smoothly along with the days, but directly moved beyond 
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+28 days, which is less likely to occur.20  To further bolster this claim, I modify the research design 
to specifically investigate the PEAD.  The results are supportive and are discussed in detail below 
in the section on further analysis. 
In sum, the results from Row 3 provide a negative answer to R3 (Are pilot firms more price 
informative post-earnings announcements in comparison to control firms?)  The negative answer, 
combined with the results from Rows 1 and 2, demonstrates that short-sellers are informed 
regarding upcoming public earnings news, and that they increase price informativeness in a more 
timely fashion.21    
Corporate Information Transparency and The Effects of Short-selling on Price 
Informativeness  
Prior research predicts a higher demand for private information acquisition when the 
precision of accounting disclosure is lower (e.g., Verrecchia 1982).  This literature argues that 
firms with limited corporate information transparency have more information asymmetry between 
managers and investors, and more inherent uncertainty about firm value than other firms, which 
suggests that stock prices of those firms will less precisely reflect their fundamentals.  
Accordingly, such lower price informativeness suggests opportunities exist for profitable private 
information acquisition activities by investors (e.g. short-sellers).  Therefore, I expect that the 
                                                 
20 This is less likely to occur unless there is an event 31 days after earnings announcement attracting all short-sellers’ 
trading.   
21 This paper is to examine the extent to which short-sellers can access information relating to earnings in advance of 
its scheduled announcement. Management forecasts is a voluntary disclosure and not a scheduled event, which makes 
investors have less incentives to collected information relating to management forecasts. Therefore, the bundled 
management forecast will confound the inference that short-sellers’ collection of private information before the 
earnings announcement. Nevertheless, to complete the analysis, I analyse the bundled management forecasts in a 
separate test. The untabulated results show that pilot firms have a significantly larger R2 than control firms during the 
announcement window and no difference during the pre-earnings announcements. The different result is consistent 
with the results from Clinch, Li, and Zhang (2015) that suggest that pilot firms increase voluntary disclosure of 
management forecasts. So, the increased price informativeness during earning announcements could be reflecting this 
for the bundled announcements. 
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increase in price efficiency for pilot firms pre-earnings announcements (relative to control firms) 
will be more pronounced for firms with a limited (or less transparent) corporate information 
environment.  
Prior literature documents a stronger market reaction to earnings announcements for small 
firms than for large ones due to the limited availability of alternative sources of information before 
release of the earnings (e.g., Atiase 1985). Given short-sellers can have information advantage by 
processing public information, the limited corporate information environment provides short-
sellers greater opportunity to process the earnings during announcements and hence to accelerate 
information that otherwise would not get into price until the post period.  Therefore, for less 
transparent firms the net effect of short-selling on price informativeness during announcements 
could be either negative (reflecting dominance of private channel) or zero (reflecting equal 
importance of public and private channels).   
To investigate the association between corporate transparency and the effects of short-
selling on price informativeness, I examine cross-sectional variation in corporate transparency 
proxied by three measures:  (1) Management guidance – whether a firm has provided management 
forecasts prior to earnings announcements.  A firm is viewed as less transparent if it does not 
provide earnings forecasts.  (2) Earnings transparency22 – whether a firm’s earnings are impounded 
into contemporaneous stock price in a more timely manner.  (3) The number of analysts.  
Management Forecasts 
Firms’ management forecasts can reduce short-sellers’ incentives to collect earnings-
related information privately.  Therefore, I predict that the result that pilot firms’ prices are more 
informative prior to earnings announcements than those of control firms will be concentrated in 
                                                 
22 This proxy is developed in Barth, Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013).   
22 
 
firms without management forecasts.  To test this prediction, I partition the sample into two sub-
samples: firms providing at least one earnings forecast pre-earnings announcements, and those 
providing no forecast. I predict that the earnings results will be more pronounced for firms without 
management forecasts.   
Table 3 reports the R2DIFF from estimating model (1) for pilot and control firms 
without/with management forecasts (Panels A/B) during Reg SHO. In Panel A, when 
RET(quarterly) is measured at days [-28, +28] (rightmost column), and the RHS return-window is 
RETi(pre_announce) (Row 1), the R
2
DIFF (0.07) is significant at the 1 percent level, suggesting that 
stock prices of pilot firms are more informative pre-earnings announcements.  When the RHS 
return-window is the during-announcement or post-announcement period (Rows 2 and 3), the 
R2DIFF is -0.03 and -0.04, respectively (both significant at the conventional levels), suggesting that 
pilot firms have less information during and post-earning announcement periods. This is consistent 
with the claim that short-sellers possess and trade on private information related to upcoming 
earnings, and hence reduce value-related information during and post-earnings announcement 
periods.  When varying the RET(quarterly) window from [-28, +28] to [-4, +4], there is a consistent 
pattern in the R2DIFF, suggesting that short-sellers are informed during all the days leading to 
earnings announcements.  
Row 1 in Table 3, Panel B reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is 
RETi(pre_announce) for firms who have issued at least one management forecast.  R
2
DIFF is in 
general not statistically significant, suggesting that pilot firms have similar levels of price 
informativeness to control firms pre-earnings announcements.  Interestingly, when RET(quarterly) 
is measured at days [-28, +28] / [-25, +25], the difference in R2DIFF is 0.09/0.1 (both significant at 
the 1 percent level).  This suggests that the pilot firms’ prices are more informative pre-earnings 
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announcement, inconsistent with the transparency hypothesis – no difference in R2 for firms with 
greater information transparency. 23  
Row 2 in Panel B reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is RETi(dur_announce).  
The R2DIFF is -0.09 (significant at 1 percent level) when RETi(quarterly) window is [-19, +19], and 
this significant R2DIFF is robust to other windows of RETi(quarterly).  Row 3 reports the R
2
DIFF 
when the RHS return-window is RETi(post_announce).  The R
2
DIFF is negative and significant at 
conventional levels in some cases, providing some evidence that short-sellers are on average 
informed traders. In general, there is less consistent evidence of R2DIFF across the different return 
windows related to the transparency hypothesis for panel B firms than for panel A firms, but it is 
not clear cut. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Earnings Transparency  
The earnings of transparent firms more precisely reflect the respective firms’ underlying 
economic conditions.  I employ a measure of transparency developed in Barth et al. (2013), based 
on the explanatory power of stock returns-earnings relation, i.e., to what extent a firm’s stock price  
reflects its earnings. A unique feature of this measure is that it allows intertemporal and cross-
sectional (industry and non-industry) variation in the earnings transparency measure. The measure 
involves a two-step procedure. In step 1, I regress firms’ annual returns on earnings and change in 
earnings, grouped by industry-year, which allows industry variation in the measure, and save the 
first R2.  In step 2, I construct a quartile portfolio based upon the residuals from Step 1, re-estimate 
                                                 
23 The observed significant difference in R2 for the two largest windows may be due to more earnings guidance for 
pilot firms. First, Clinch et al. (2015) documents that pilot firms are more likely to disclose bad news management 
forecasts, and therefore impound negative news in a more timely fashion. Second, Clinch et al. (2015) finds that the 
early-disclosed bad news are not pre-announcement warnings (i.e., management forecasts issued after the fiscal 
quarter end and before actual earnings announcements), which is consistent with the findings in panel B – no 
difference in R2DIFF when the return-window covers days closer to earnings announcements. 
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the regression model within each portfolio annually, and save the second R2.  The sum of the two 
R2 is the transparency measure.  I then partition the full sample into two groups based on the firms’ 
transparency measures relative to the median, and predict that the main findings will be more 
pronounced in firms with less transparency.  
Panel A in Table 4 reports the R2DIFF for firms with less earnings transparency. Row 1 
reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is RETi(pre_announce). The R
2
DIFF is 0.08 
(significant at 1 percent level) when the window of RETi(quarterly) is [-28, +28], and it is 
consistently and statistically significant with most other windows of RETi(quarterly).  This is 
consistent with short-sellers possessing private information.  Row 2 reports the R2DIFF when the 
RHS return-window is RETi(dur_announce). The R
2
DIFF is in general statistically insignificant, 
which might reflect equal importance of two channels for less-earnings-transparent firms.  Row 3 
reports the R2DIFF when RHS return-window is RETi(post_announce).  The R
2
DIFF is significantly 
negative at conventional levels with all windows of RETi(quarterly) (except [-28, +28]), consistent 
with informed short-sellers. 
Panel B in Table 4 reports R2DIFF for firms with greater earnings transparency.  In general, 
the findings suggest no difference in price informativeness between pilot and control firms around 
earnings announcements.  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
The Number of Analysts 
 I partitioned the sample into two sub-samples based on the number of analysts following 
a firm relative to the median.  I predict that prior to earnings announcements, the difference in 




Panel A in Table 5 reports the R2DIFF from the estimating model (1) for pilot and control 
firms with lower analyst coverage during Reg SHO.  Similar to the findings for the two other 
proxies for information transparency, the observation that pilot firms are more informative pre-
earnings announcements occurs mainly in firms with a lower analyst following, which is suggested 
by the significantly positive R2DIFF in row 1 Panel A (0.05-0.09 significant at the conventional 
levels).  Row 2 reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is RETi(dur_announce). The R
2
DIFF 
is in general insignificant, suggesting that pilot and control firms have similar information content 
during announcements.  This might reflect the equal importance of private and public channels for 
short-sellers for firms with a lower analyst following have larger earnings news during 
announcements. Finally, Row 3 reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is 
RETi(post_announce).  The R
2
DIFF is significantly negative in most cases, consistent with short-
sellers being informed. 
Row 1 in Panel B reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is RETi(pre_announce) 
for firms with greater analyst following.  The R2DIFF is significantly positive when the window of 
RETi(quarterly) is [-16, +16], [-19, +19], [-25, +25] and [-28, +28].  Row 2 reports the R
2
DIFF when 
the RHS return-window is RETi(dur_announce).  The R
2
DIFF is in general statistically insignificant, 
except in some cases that might be corresponding to the increase in earnings informativeness pre-
earnings announcements.  Finally, Row 3 reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-window is 
RETi(post_announce).  The R
2
DIFF is statistically significant and negative in some cases, consistent 
with short-sellers being informed. 
In sum, short-sellers are more likely to collect private information when corporate 
transparency is limited. Additionally, the dominant role of the private channel is dampened -- no 
difference in R2 during earnings announcements for firms with lower analyst coverage and less 
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earnings transparency. In contrast, for firms with greater information transparency (proxied by 
earnings transparency), there is no evidence for the private information collection and superior 
ability in public information processing. Although there is some evidence for firms with greater 
information transparency (proxied by the issue of management forecasts or analyst coverage), 
R2DIFF across different return windows is less consistent and clear as in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Alternative Information Sources for Short-sellers  
It is possible that the increase in pilot firms’ price informativeness before earnings 
announcements is attributable to publicly available (rather than private) information upon which 
short-sellers might trade before upcoming earnings announcements.  In my research design, I 
mitigate this concern by restricting RETi(quarterly) to be measured over the [-28, +28] window, 
relative to earnings announcements, to dampen the effect of prior-quarter earnings.  Nevertheless, 
this possibility cannot completely be ruled out.  In this section, I examine two types of publicly 
available information sources potentially employed by short-sellers. 
Prior-quarter earnings surprise 
Prior studies (e.g., Joy, Litzenberger, and McEnally 1977; Latane and Jones 1979) 
document that a post earnings announcement drift (PEAD) exists in quarterly earnings 
announcements and can be exploited by forming portfolios based upon unexpected earnings (UE).  
In addition, Bernard and Thomas (1990) examine the possible reason for the anomaly, and 
conclude that it is more likely market mispricing than a risk factor.  The implication of this relation 
to short-sellers is that firms reporting a positive/negative earnings surprise in the previous quarter 
are more likely to be followed by a positive/negative earnings surprise in the current quarter.  
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Therefore, short-sellers may anticipate less/more profitability if earnings surprise is 
positive/negative in the previous quarter.  
To investigate this possibility, I partitioned the sample into two sub-samples based upon 
prior-quarter UE relative to zero: firm-quarters with positive prior-quarter UE and those with 
negative prior-quarter UE.  If short-sellers trade on prior-quarter UE, they would expect that firms 
with positive prior-quarter UE will experience positive current-quarter UE, and therefore would 
not trade intensively in this sub-sample.  In contrast, short-sellers would expect negative current-
quarter UE for firms with negative prior-quarter UE, and would short-sell them pre-earnings 
announcements. 
Panel A in Table 6 reports the R2DIFF from estimating model (1) for pilot and control firms 
with positive prior-quarter UE during Reg SHO.  Row 1 reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-
window is RETi(pre_announce).  With various windows of RETi(quarterly), the R
2
DIFF is 0.03-0.08 
(significant at conventional levels) and comparable, even stronger, than that for firms with negative 
prior-quarter UE in Row 1 of Panel B.  This is inconsistent with the prediction that short-sellers 
employ prior-quarter earnings in their trading, and hence mitigates the concern that the main results 
(in Table 2) are attributable to this source of publicly available information (i.e. prior-quarter 
earnings). 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
Growth vs. value firms 
Prior studies (e.g., Fama and French 1992; Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 1994) 
document that high growth firms experience low returns. One explanation is that high growth firms 
experience asymmetric market reactions to unfavourable earnings news relative to value firms 
(Skinner and Sloan 2002).  An implication of this finding to short-sellers is that they can short 
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firms of high growth because those firms provide short-sellers with a greater potential for profits 
when the earnings news is unfavourable, in comparison to value firms.  To investigate this I 
partitioned firms into two sub-samples: firms with small prior-quarter market-to-book equity ratios 
(MTB), and those with large MTB.  If short-sellers trade on MTB, they would short more 
intensively before unfavourable earnings news in a sub-sample with large prior-quarter MTB. 
Panel A in Table 7 reports the R2DIFF from estimating model (1) for pilot and control firms 
with small prior-quarter MTB during Reg SHO.  Row 1 reports the R2DIFF when the RHS return-
window is RETi(pre_announce).  With various windows of RETi(quarterly), the R
2
DIFF is in the 
range of 0.003-0.12, and statistically significant at the conventional levels in most cases.  This is 
comparable with the R2DIFF for firms with large prior-quarter MTB in Row 1 of Panel B.  This 
finding suggests that short-sellers do not rely on MTB in trading before unfavourable earnings 
news, reinforcing that the findings in Table 2 are attributable to short-sellers’ private information 
relating to upcoming earnings. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Further Analysis 
Post-earnings-announcement Drift (PEAD) 
PEAD is a well-known measure of price efficiency.  If short-sellers are informed investors, 
via either a private or a public channel, and their trading improves stock price informativeness, I 
expect a smaller PEAD for the pilot firms during Reg SHO. In contrast, if short-selling is 
uninformed trading, PEAD is expected to show no change or be even larger.  To investigate the 
effect of short-selling on PEAD, I redefine RETi(quarterly) in model (1) as buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns from days -1 to +31, namely [-1, +31].  In addition, the RHS is RETi(dur_announce) only.
24  
                                                 
24 By design, there are only two sub-periods in this test: RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce). 
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This modification is illustrated in the Fig. 1, Panel B. Following Ball and Shivakumar (2008), 
stock price efficiency is measured by comparing the coefficient of RETi(dur_announce) in model 
(1) with unity; that is, the price underreacts/overreacts to earnings if the coefficient is greater/lesser 
than unity.  
Panel A in Table 8 reports the coefficient of RETi(dur_announce) for pilot and control 
firms pre-Reg SHO.  When the window of RETi(quarterly) is [-1, +7], the coefficient for 
pilot/control firms is 1.03/1.03 (greater than 1 at the 5 percent significance level), suggesting an 
under-reaction to earnings announcements for both pilot and control firms.  In addition, the 
difference between these two coefficients is 0.001 and statistically not significant (t = -0.06), 
consistent with the effective random selection procedure in the sample construction.  When 
RETi(quarterly) is measured at other event-windows, the coefficient for pilot/control firms is 
consistently greater than 1, and the same inference can be drawn.  
Panel B in Table 8 reports the coefficient of RETi(dur_announce) during Reg SHO.  When 
the window of RETi(quarterly) is [-1, +31], the coefficient for pilot firms is 0.96 which is not 
significantly different from 1 (t = -1.05), suggesting that short-selling removes PEAD, and is 
consistent with the notion that short-sellers do not primarily drive prices away from fundamentals 
(Boehmer and Wu 2013).  The coefficient for controls firms is 1.07, and is significantly different 
from 1 (t = 2.68), suggesting control firms experience PEAD.  In addition, the difference in these 
two coefficients, -0.1, is significantly different from 0 (t = -2.43), reinforcing the effect of short-
selling on reducing pilot firms’ PEAD.  When RETi(quarterly) is measured at other event-
windows, the coefficient for pilot/control firms is consistently not greater/greater than 1, and the 
same inference can be drawn. In sum, the above results suggest that short-sellers reduce PEAD 
and improve the informativeness of stock prices (Saffi and Sigurdsson 2010).  
30 
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Post Reg SHO (after July 2007) 
The SEC lifted the price-test for all firms from July 2007, which implies that short-sellers 
incurred the same cost of short-selling pilot and control groups post Reg SHO.  Therefore, the 
information arrival around earnings announcements would be similar between the two groups post-
Reg SHO.  To examine this implication, I re-estimated model (1) for the one year immediately 
after expiration of Reg SHO (July 2007-June 2008).  If the reported findings in Table 2 are due to 
the changes of short-selling cost, I should observe no difference in R2 between pilot and control 
groups post-Reg SHO. Untabulated results show some supporting evidence.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this study, I examine when and how short-sellers are informed by exploiting a quasi-
natural experiment setting – Reg SHO. During the implementation of Reg SHO, pilot firms 
increase (decrease) their price informativeness pre- (during and post-) earnings announcements 
than control firms do. These results are consistent with the notion that short-sellers are informed 
investors, and they have private channels to acquire information.  The results are robust to various 
time-frame windows centred on earnings announcements. 
I contribute to the literature by documenting that a predominant section of short-sellers are 
informed via private channel, and increase price informativeness in a more timely manner.  
Furthermore, I provide some evidence that opaque firms’ information environments increase short-
sellers’ private information collection to fill the gap of information asymmetry between managers 
and investors.  Finally, this study documents that short-sellers do not disturb the market when bad 
news (e.g. negative earnings news) is announced. Instead, they impound such news more 
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Time frame for computing stock returns for firm i at quarter t pre (RET(pre_announce)) 
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Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market 
returns). RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. Returns 
before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns before earnings 
announcement.   Returns during post-announcement period, RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal 




Summary statistics of sample firms before Reg SHO announcement 
        
                
  pilot group control group Difference in mean 
 
# obs. Mean std. dev. # obs. Mean std. dev.  (pilot-control) 
RET(pre_announce) 7058 0.011 0.148 14369 0.013 0.158 -0.002 
RET(dur_announce) 7058 0.004 0.081 14369 0.004 0.090 0 
RET(post_announce) 7058 0.025 0.147 14369 0.025 0.159 0 
RET(quarterly) 7058 0.040 0.235 14369 0.042 0.253 -0.002 
SIZE 7058 6.925 1.715 14369 6.943 1.829 -0.018 
ROA 7058 0.005 0.047 14369 0.001 0.059 0.004*** 
MTB 7058 3.045 44.698 14369 4.590 178.384 -1.546 
        
The sample is comprised of firm-quarters before the announcement of Reg SHO (06/01/2002 - 07/28/2004). The pilot 
group is comprised of the Russell 3000 components that are on the pilot list of Reg SHO in June 2004. The control group 
is comprised of all other components on the Russell 3000. Mean differences from zero in varibles between pilot and 
control groups (assumed independent samples) are tested using two-sample t-tests (unpaired). 
Variable Definitions: 
       
RET(pre_announce) = 
value-weighted adjusted accumulative returns at days of [-28 -2], where date 0 is the 
earnings announcement date;  
RET(dur_announce) = value-weighted adjusted accumulative returns at days of [-1 +1], where date 0 is the 
earnings announcement date;  
RET(post_announce) = value-weighted adjusted accumulative returns at days of [+2 +28], where date 0 is the 
earnings announcement date; 
 
RET(quarterly) = value-weighted adjusted accumulative returns at days of [-28, +28], where date 0 is the 
earnings announcement date; 
 
SIZE = logarithm of the market value of equity at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 
MTB = ratio of market value of equity to book value at the beginning of a fiscal quarter; 








Effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.38  
R2pilot 0.14 0.23 0.29 0.36 0.38 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.45 
R2DIFF 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06 
p-value 0.030 0.000 0.090 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.64 0.49 0.40 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.19  
R2pilot 0.65 0.45 0.38 0.31 0.26 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 
R2DIFF 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
p-value 0.460 0.012 0.030 0.016 0.032 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.006 




R2pilot 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.34 
R2DIFF -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.07 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 
p-value 0.012 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.136 0.040 0.000 0.090 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns 
-- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, 
respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), 
relative to earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around 
earnings announcement. Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during 
post-announcement period, RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO 
(i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters 
from the twenty quarters immediately before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and 
control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I 
assume that this empirical distribution reflects the distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control 
firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






Management forecasts and the effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 
Panel A: Subsample without management forecasts 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.28 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37  
R2pilot 0.14 0.22 0.28 0.35 0.38 0.39 0.41 0.42 0.43 
R2DIFF 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 
p-value 0.008 0.002 0.026 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.004 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.64 0.49 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.20  
R2pilot 0.65 0.47 0.39 0.32 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.17 
R2DIFF 0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 
p-value 0.498 0.024 0.038 0.080 0.070 0.024 0.009 0.006 0.032 




R2pilot 0.15 0.23 0.26 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.35 
R2DIFF -0.06 -0.07 -0.09 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
p-value 0.038 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.028 0.282 0.142 0.000 0.054 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms that issue no management forecasts prior to earnings announcements. 
Management forecast (MF) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast before earnings announcement and zero otherwise 
(Source: I/B/E/S guidance). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-
period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 





Panel B: Subsample with management forecasts 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.20 0.35 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.55 0.53 0.52  
R2pilot 0.19 0.39 0.45 0.48 0.48 0.54 0.57 0.62 0.61 
R2DIFF -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.09 
p-value 0.632 0.354 0.292 0.254 0.666 0.166 0.344 0.000 0.010 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.57 0.39 0.26 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.10  
R2pilot 0.49 0.22 0.15 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 
R2DIFF -0.08 -0.18 -0.11 -0.07 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 
p-value 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.098 0.002 0.202 0.240 0.280 




R2pilot 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.29 0.21 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.24 
R2DIFF -0.07 -0.10 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 0.01 
p-value 0.268 0.034 0.116 0.618 0.012 0.102 0.042 0.014 0.432 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms that issue at least one management forecast prior to earnings announcements. 
Management forecast (MF) is an indicator variable equal to one if a firm issues at least one management forecast before earnings announcement and zero otherwise 
(Source: I/B/E/S guidance). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-
period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






Earnings transparency and the effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 
Panel A: Subsample with low earnings transparency 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.28 0.32 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.39  
R2pilot 0.16 0.24 0.29 0.35 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.47 
R2DIFF 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08 
p-value 0.164 0.094 0.122 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.63 0.50 0.40 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.22 0.19  
R2pilot 0.65 0.47 0.40 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.19 
R2DIFF 0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 
p-value 0.000 0.404 0.324 0.460 0.496 0.324 0.682 0.350 0.650 




R2pilot 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.35 0.35 
R2DIFF -0.05 -0.05 -0.13 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 
p-value 0.074 0.016 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.202 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with earnings transparency below the median of earnings transparency of the 
full sample. Earnings transparency is derived from a two-step procedure. In step 1, I regress firms’ annual returns on earnings and change in earnings, grouped by 
industry-year, which allows industry variation in the measure, and save the first R2.  In step 2, I construct a quartile portfolio based upon the residuals from Step 1, re-
estimate the regression model within each portfolio annually, and save the second R2. The sum of the two R2 is the transparency measure. See Barth et al. (2013). This 
table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- 
RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 




Panel B: Subsample with high earnings transparency 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.12 0.19 0.27 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.36  
R2pilot 0.12 0.19 0.24 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.33 0.35 0.36 
R2DIFF -0.01 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 
p-value 0.046 0.018 0.106 0.086 0.464 0.420 0.638 0.486 0.230 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.66 0.50 0.40 0.34 0.30 0.25 0.24 0.21 0.19  
R2pilot 0.64 0.47 0.40 0.32 0.29 0.25 0.22 0.20 0.19 
R2DIFF -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
p-value 0.086 0.054 0.108 0.124 0.182 0.178 0.178 0.192 0.298 




R2pilot 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.27 
R2DIFF -0.03 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.06 
p-value 0.498 0.104 0.006 0.060 0.166 0.412 0.198 0.000 0.004 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with earnings transparency below the median of earnings transparency of the 
full sample. Earnings transparency is derived from a two-step procedure. In step 1, I regress firms’ annual returns on earnings and change in earnings, grouped by 
industry-year, which allows industry variation in the measure, and save the first R2.  In step 2, I construct a quartile portfolio based upon the residuals from Step 1, re-
estimate the regression model within each portfolio annually, and save the second R2. The sum of the two R2 is the transparency measure. See Barth et al. (2013). This 
table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- 
RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






Analyst coverage and the effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 
Panel A: Subsample with low analyst coverage 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.09 0.18 0.25 0.26 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37  
R2pilot 0.15 0.26 0.28 0.34 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.43 0.43 
R2DIFF 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.06 
p-value 0.002 0.004 0.208 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.63 0.47 0.38 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.21 0.17  
R2pilot 0.64 0.43 0.34 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.16 
R2DIFF 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 
p-value 0.478 0.174 0.138 0.082 0.122 0.048 0.074 0.176 0.234 




R2pilot 0.15 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.39 
R2DIFF -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 
p-value 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.090 0.088 0.546 
 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with the number of analyst below the median of the number of analyst of the 
full sample (Source: I/B/E/S). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in 
sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 





Panel B: Subsample with high analyst coverage 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.17 0.24 0.30 0.35 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.40 0.41  
R2pilot 0.13 0.21 0.30 0.37 0.39 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.48 
R2DIFF -0.04 -0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.07 
p-value 0.362 0.312 0.122 0.172 0.018 0.002 0.128 0.048 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.66 0.50 0.42 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.21  
R2pilot 0.65 0.47 0.41 0.34 0.28 0.22 0.21 0.17 0.16 
R2DIFF -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 
p-value 0.468 0.022 0.066 0.186 0.138 0.064 0.128 0.044 0.052 




R2pilot 0.15 0.22 0.24 0.29 0.32 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.29 
R2DIFF -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.08 -0.07 
p-value 0.304 0.068 0.078 0.350 0.402 0.786 0.102 0.002 0.004 
 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with the number of analyst above the median of the number of analyst of the 
full sample (Source: I/B/E/S). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in 
sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






Prior-quarter unexpected earnings (UE) and the effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 
Panel A: Subsample with positive prior-quarter UE 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.13 0.19 0.27 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38  
R2pilot 0.12 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.44 0.44 
R2DIFF -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.07 
p-value 0.108 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.63 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.29 0.26 0.23 0.21 0.18  
R2pilot 0.66 0.50 0.38 0.31 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.16 
R2DIFF 0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
p-value 0.524 0.051 0.028 0.016 0.012 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 




R2pilot 0.13 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.30 0.33 0.36 0.34 0.33 
R2DIFF -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 
p-value 0.012 0.016 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.156 0.004 0.002 0.030 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with positive prior-quarter unexpected earnings (UE), defined as the 
difference between actual earnings and analyst consensus (Source: I/B/E/S). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of 
quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings 
announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 




Panel B: Subsample with negative prior-quarter UE 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.12 0.22 0.28 0.30 0.35 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39  
R2pilot 0.17 0.25 0.26 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.41 0.44 0.46 
R2DIFF 0.05 0.03 -0.02 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.06 
p-value 0.028 0.170 0.704 0.092 0.034 0.006 0.088 0.000 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.66 0.48 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20  
R2pilot 0.63 0.40 0.37 0.30 0.26 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 
R2DIFF -0.03 -0.08 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 
p-value 0.406 0.000 0.092 0.152 0.420 0.186 0.276 0.190 0.566 




R2pilot 0.17 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.35 
R2DIFF -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06 -0.02 
p-value 0.178 0.016 0.000 0.096 0.278 0.432 0.264 0.184 0.512 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with negative prior-quarter unexpected earnings (UE), defined as the 
difference between actual earnings and analyst consensus (Source: I/B/E/S). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control firms from the following regression of 
quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings 
announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






Prior-quarter market-to-book ratio (MTB) and the effect of Reg SHO on price informativeness 
 
Panel A: Subsample with small prior-quarter MTB 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.13 0.21 0.27 0.31 0.35 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.38  
R2pilot 0.13 0.20 0.31 0.37 0.40 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.48 
R2DIFF 0.003 -0.01 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.12 0.10 
p-value 0.012 0.272 0.148 0.048 0.054 0.010 0.020 0.002 0.000 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.64 0.49 0.41 0.35 0.30 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.20  
R2pilot 0.63 0.44 0.35 0.28 0.24 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.12 
R2DIFF -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.08 
p-value 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 




R2pilot 0.18 0.27 0.27 0.30 0.32 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.39 
R2DIFF -0.08 -0.09 -0.12 -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
p-value 0.084 0.002 0.000 0.032 0.022 0.049 0.274 0.004 0.172 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with prior-quarter market-to-book ratio (MTB) below the median of MTB 
for the full sample. MTB is defined as the ratio of market value of equity divided by the book value of equity (Source: COMPUSTAT). This table presents the R2 for 
pilot and control firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), 
RET(dur_announce) and RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 





Panel B: Subsample with large prior-quarter MTB 
 Window of RET(quarterly): day relative to earnings announcements (day 0) 
RHS variable   [-4, +4] [-7, +7] [-10, +10] [-13, +13] [-16, +16] [-19, +19] [-22, +22] [-25, +25] [-28, +28] 
RET(pre_announce) R2control 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.28 0.34 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.39  
R2pilot 0.15 0.25 0.28 0.34 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.41 0.43 
R2DIFF 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.04 
p-value 0.182 0.036 0.196 0.000 0.028 0.006 0.038 0.014 0.014 
RET(dur_announce) R2control 0.64 0.48 0.39 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.20 0.18  
R2pilot 0.66 0.46 0.39 0.33 0.29 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.20 
R2DIFF 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 
p-value 0.712 0.368 0.560 0.638 0.754 0.462 0.762 0.690 0.840 




R2pilot 0.12 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.30 
R2DIFF -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
p-value 0.124 0.102 0.098 0.002 0.010 0.310 0.112 0.048 0.126 
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). The sample is comprised of firms with prior-quarter market-to-book ratio (MTB) above the median of MTB. 
MTB is defined as the ratio of market value of equity divided by the book value of equity (Source: COMPUSTAT). This table presents the R2 for pilot and control 
firms from the following regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns in sub-period returns -- RET(pre_announce), RET(dur_announce) and 
RET(post_announce) around earnings announcements, respectively.  
RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(sub_period) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -t to +t (designated [-t, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. 
Returns before earnings announcements, RET(pre_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days -t to -2.  Returns during post-announcement period, 
RET(post_announce), are buy-and-hold abnormal returns at days +2 to +t. The statistic test of the difference in R2 during Reg SHO (i.e., R2DIFF) is based on the 
empirical distribution of the R2DIFF in the pre-Reg SHO period. Specifically, I randomly select, with replacement, eight quarters from the twenty quarters immediately 
before the Reg SHO announcements and re-estimate the model (1). Each time, I collect one R2DIFF between pilot and control firms. By repeating this procedure 1000 
times, I obtain an empirical distribution of R2DIFF (with 1000 observations) based on the pre-Reg SHO period. I assume that this empirical distribution reflects the 
distribution of R2DIFF under the null hypothesis of no difference in short-selling between pilot and control firms. The p-value of the R2DIFF is provided. 






The effect of short-selling on post-earnings announcement drift 
Panel A: Before Reg SHO  
             



























βcontrol 1.03 2.76 1.06 3.81 1.06 2.90 1.06 2.57 1.06 2.30 1.08 2.56 1.06 1.94 














               
βpilot  1.03 2.87 1.03 2.11 1.04 2.54 1.05 2.75 1.05 1.92 1.04 1.38 1.03 1.20 
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Panel B: During Reg SHO  
             



























βcontrol 1.01 1.28 1.03 1.94 1.04 2.85 1.04 2.01 1.06 2.65 1.07 2.71 1.07 2.68 














               
βpilot  0.99 -1.15 0.96 -2.15 0.98 -1.02 0.97 -1.22 0.98 -0.63 0.97 -1.02 0.96 -1.05 
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-2.43   
Sample period is from 2005 to 2007 (during Reg SHO). This table presents the coefficient of RET(dur_announce), β1, for pilot and control firms from the following 
regression of quarterly returns -- RET(quarterly) on returns at announcements, RET(dur_announce)  
                                                                                         RET(quarterly) = β0 +  β1RET(dur_announce) + ɛ  (1) 
Quarterly returns, RET(quarterly) , are buy-and-hold abnormal returns (adjusted by value-weighted market returns) over days -1 to +t (designated [-1, +t]), relative to 
earnings-announcement date, day 0. For brevity, I untabulte the results for two periods [-1, +19] and [-1, +22]. Earnings-announcement returns, RET(dur_announce), are 
3-day buy-and-hold abnormal returns around earnings announcement. The t-statistics to test the null hypothesis: β = 1 is computed as (β-1) /Std. error. Additionally, the t-
statistics to test the null hypothesis: βpilot = βcontrol is computed as (βpilot  - βcontrol)/squared root(Std. errorpilot2 + Std. errorcontrol2).   
 
 
